Since 1945, mines have been responsible for sinking or severely damaging 15 of the 19 U.S. ships lost in combat. Despite this sobering statistic, mine warfare remains an underdeveloped and often overlooked area of focus for the U.S. Navy. Meanwhile, adversaries, allies, and partners around the globe continue to expand their capabilities, consistently reaffirming the strategic importance of mines in modern naval warfare. From Ukraine’s mine-laden Black Sea to Russian efforts to thwart maritime operations, mines have once again proven to be a powerful, low-tech, yet highly effective tool of sea power. So, the question remains: Is the U.S. military simply observing these developments, or are they learning from them?

Ukraine’s Early Use of Mines: A Case Study

During Russia’s initial invasion of Ukraine, the Ukrainian government swiftly turned to mine warfare, laying mines in coastal waters to thwart a potential amphibious assault. This strategy disrupted Russia’s naval operations and highlighted the continued relevance of mines in modern conflicts. Since then, both military and civilian vessels have struck mines, wreaking havoc on important sea lanes and putting a significant strain on maritime trade routes. Russia has continued to lay mines throughout the conflict, and, even in the absence of dramatic technological warfare like hypersonic missiles, the impact of mines has been undeniably strategic.

Taiwan Takes Notes

Across the Pacific, Taiwan is closely watching the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, keen to learn from the use of mines in the Black Sea. In response, Taiwan has begun to bolster its own mine-laying and countermeasure exercises, anticipating a future conflict with China. This proactive approach stands in stark contrast to the U.S. Navy’s declining mine warfare capabilities.

The U.S. Navy’s Aging Mine Warfare Assets

While the U.S. military’s attention has focused on advanced, high-tech platforms, its mine warfare capabilities have decayed. Legacy systems like the Avenger Class Mine Countermeasure Ships and the MH-53 helicopter are on the brink of obsolescence. Meanwhile, the Navy has struggled to modernize its mine countermeasure operations, relying on outdated platforms and failing to integrate innovative solutions to fill these gaps.

The Persistent Challenge of Mine Warfare

Mines may lack the spectacle of hypersonic missiles or stealth bombers, but their effectiveness on the battlefield is undeniable. The key to their success lies in the difficulty of mine countermeasures. The ocean is an inherently challenging environment, and factors like corrosion, background noise, and false sonar contacts only complicate efforts to neutralize mines. Successful mine countermeasures demand highly specialized equipment, exceptional operators, and a level of persistence that is difficult to maintain without globally deployable, capable assets.

Additionally, mining is a warfare tactic with a low barrier to entry but a high return on investment. A few strategically placed, inexpensive mines can disrupt major trade routes and cripple naval operations. This reality became painfully clear when even well-equipped warships like the USS Princeton and USS Tripoli fell victim to mines. And with the advent of stealth mines, this threat is only set to increase.

The U.S. Navy’s Neglected Mine Warfare Gap

While the effectiveness of mines continues to be proven by adversaries and allies alike, the U.S. Navy’s mine warfare capabilities are alarmingly insufficient. The Avenger-class mine countermeasure ships, which are due to be decommissioned by 2027, are nearing the end of their operational life. These ships are slated to be replaced by the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), but the LCS’s current mine countermeasure mission packages are not up to the task of replacing the Avengers’ full detect-to-engage capability. Furthermore, the LCS has a limited capacity to operate in a wide range of environmental conditions, and there are challenges related to crew proficiency and mission readiness.

Airborne mine countermeasures are also in a similar state of disrepair. The MH-53 helicopter, which has been the cornerstone of U.S. mine countermeasures for decades, is rapidly aging, and its replacement, the MH-60 helicopter, is underpowered and lacks full capability to effectively neutralize mines. While the MH-60’s mine detection system is a step forward, it is still limited in its application and effectiveness in less-than-ideal conditions.

Hope on the Horizon?

Despite these challenges, there is reason for cautious optimism. The U.S. Navy’s explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams have developed a promising full detect-to-engage capability through the integration of clearance divers, unmanned systems, and small surface craft. This innovation was demonstrated in 2022 when the USS Sioux City deployed with a detachment of EOD personnel, showcasing the potential of these specialized teams to neutralize mines in a variety of environments.

The State of U.S. Mining Capabilities: An Alarming Outlook

The situation surrounding U.S. mine warfare capabilities is far more concerning. Decades-old technology and inadequate funding have hindered the development of modern, effective mining systems. Technologies such as the Quickstrike mine and submarine-launched mobile mines, which are the core of the U.S. mining arsenal, are half a century old and desperately in need of innovation. Sadly, efforts to modernize these systems — including the development of advanced mine delivery methods — have stalled in recent years due to funding shortfalls and a lack of political will.

A Call to Action

In a world where mine warfare is proving to be an increasingly relevant and effective threat, the U.S. Navy must recognize the urgency of addressing its mine warfare capabilities. The Department of Defense must leverage emerging technologies, embrace rapid experimentation, and foster closer collaboration with allies and the engineering community to quickly rebuild its mine countermeasure and mine-laying capacities. If the U.S. Navy does not heed the lessons from past mine warfare failures — both at sea and on the shores of Ukraine — it risks falling behind in a critical aspect of modern naval combat.