In the ongoing global security landscape, logistics have become as important as military firepower, with recent events highlighting the undeniable value of an effective logistical network. A stark reminder of this lesson comes from Russia’s disastrous invasion of Ukraine, where an enormous convoy of military vehicles was stuck northeast of Kyiv for weeks, unable to fulfill its objective. The failures of Russia’s logistics operations were so glaring that they became a defining image of the war, demonstrating how poor supply and maintenance could cripple an army. At the same time, Ukraine’s efficient and strategic targeting of Russian supply lines turned into a major factor in its success, turning logistical shortcomings into a battlefield advantage. For U.S. military planners, this should serve as a critical reminder that no matter how advanced the technology or weapons, without a solid logistics plan, military operations are destined for failure.

The Challenge of Logistics in the Pacific

The logistical challenges in the Indo-Pacific are far more complex than those in other parts of the world, primarily because of the region’s vast expanse and maritime nature. In contrast to Russia’s land-based military campaign in Ukraine, a war in the Indo-Pacific will involve moving personnel and heavy equipment thousands of miles over contested waters. The U.S. military, particularly the Army and Marine Corps, is already developing plans to acquire intra-theater watercraft to address this logistical gap. However, unless these efforts are scaled up significantly and coordinated across all branches of the military, the U.S. may find itself woefully unprepared to sustain operations in a contested Pacific theater. The danger is clear: failure to adapt means risking a repeat of Russia’s logistical blunders—this time in the Western Pacific.

A History of Logistics Failures

Historically, logistics have been the backbone of every major conflict. During World War II, the U.S. military operated over 111,000 ships and watercraft to support the movement of materials and personnel across the globe. Even in the post-WWII era, logistics played a central role, and the numbers required to sustain large-scale military operations have not decreased. The U.S. Army’s current watercraft fleet, a mere 120 vessels, is outdated and insufficient for modern warfare in the Pacific. By 2027, this fleet will shrink even further, leaving the U.S. Army with just 74 craft. This is a significant problem when you consider that a single deployment of an infantry brigade combat team, consisting of 4,750 soldiers and 1,800 vehicles, would require 61 logistics vessels—nearly eight times the current number available. With the Pacific’s vast distances and the growing threat from China, the current fleet is alarmingly inadequate for sustained operations.

Reassessing the Need for Logistics Vessels

The logistical challenges faced in the Pacific are not just about numbers—they are about capability. The current watercraft in service, such as the Army’s logistics support vessels, are able to transport heavy equipment and personnel over thousands of miles, self-deploy without ports, and offload directly on shore. These vessels are vital for any large-scale military operation in the Indo-Pacific, where ports will be heavily contested and supply lines stretched thin. But the U.S. military’s current plans, such as the Navy’s Light Amphibious Warship (LAW), which aims to fulfill similar roles, are hindered by high costs. While the LAW is envisioned as a low-cost, lightweight solution, its projected price tag of $150 million per ship—five times more than the Army’s logistics vessels—is concerning. This price hike could undermine the Marine Corps’ goal of obtaining 24 to 35 small, affordable logistics vessels for the region. A strategy that focuses on reducing cost per ship, without compromising capability, is essential to achieving the necessary logistics capacity.

The Need for Joint Coordination

The Army and Navy are developing remarkably similar vessels for similar purposes, but their efforts remain disjointed, with little inter-service coordination. This approach risks inefficiency and duplication of efforts. A coordinated, joint approach would not only save resources but would also ensure that both services are equipped with the right tools to support operations across the Indo-Pacific. It is essential that the U.S. military prioritizes logistics and mobility in its planning—without these critical capabilities, other advanced weapon systems will simply be ornamental, unable to reach the fight when needed.

Policy Recommendations for U.S. Military Leadership

The U.S. military faces a pressing need to address its logistics shortcomings in the Pacific. A clear and unified policy approach should focus on:

1. Reviewing the Value of Light Amphibious Warships: The Navy must deliver a detailed report on the operational benefits of the LAW compared to the Army’s logistics support vessels. This analysis should assess cost, utility, and efficiency, ensuring that each branch’s logistics assets are optimized for the theater of operations.
2. Pursuing Joint Logistics Efforts: The Army and Navy should collaborate on the development of logistics vessels that meet the needs of both services. This joint effort should be presented to the Secretary of Defense to ensure that resources are allocated wisely and that both services are prepared for the challenges of the Indo-Pacific.
3. Preparing for the Worst-Case Scenario: The U.S. military must reevaluate its logistics posture in the face of a potential conflict with China, taking into account the high risk of adversary missile strikes targeting ports and airports. Reports should be delivered assessing how U.S. forces can sustain operations through degraded or destroyed infrastructure, ensuring that U.S. forces are capable of operating in contested environments.

The lessons from Russia’s logistics failures in Ukraine cannot be ignored. The U.S. military must prepare for a conflict in the Indo-Pacific, ensuring that logistics are prioritized alongside combat capabilities. Without the right logistics infrastructure and strategies in place, even the most advanced military force risks being sidelined by a lack of support, just as Russia’s forces were during their disastrous campaign in Ukraine.

By addressing these concerns now, the U.S. can avoid repeating Russia’s mistakes and ensure that its forces are ready to meet the challenges of a new era of global competition and conflict.

Chris Bernotavicius is a Navy commander and military fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).
Michelle Macander is a Marine Corps lieutenant colonel and strategist on the Joint Staff’s Joint Force Development Team.
Danielle Ngo is an Army colonel and military fellow at CSIS.
John Schaus is a fellow at CSIS, focusing on defense and security issues in the Asia-Pacific.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the Department of the Army, Department of the Navy, Department of Defense, or any other organization affiliated with the authors.