Since the devastating famine and economic collapse of the 1990s, North Korea has struggled to rebuild its economy while sustaining one of the world’s largest conventional militaries. The collapse of the Soviet bloc and the rise of U.S. military interventionism left Pyongyang feeling vulnerable, necessitating continued investment in national defense despite severe economic strains. Over the last 25 years, the United States has engaged in 188 military interventions, with a focus on formerly Soviet-aligned states like Iraq, demonstrating the shifting geopolitical landscape. In response to these mounting external threats, North Korea prioritized its military capabilities, particularly its nuclear arsenal, as both a deterrent and a cost-effective alternative to a bloated conventional force.

Critics in the West, including former U.S. President George W. Bush, have often portrayed North Korea’s nuclear program as a drain on its economy, branding the nation as a member of the “Axis of Evil” and accusing it of neglecting its citizens’ well-being to fund its weapons program. However, this narrative fails to consider the economic logic behind Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions. Nuclear weapons provide a cost-effective means of national defense, allowing North Korea to reduce its dependence on large conventional forces. This strategy has historical precedence; both the United States and the Soviet Union relied on nuclear weapons during the Cold War to scale back their conventional military expenditures without compromising national security.

For instance, the U.S. reduced its troop presence in South Korea during the 1950s by deploying tactical nuclear weapons to the peninsula, enabling a significant cut in conventional forces while maintaining strategic deterrence. Similarly, the Soviet Union reduced its military spending in Europe by emphasizing nuclear artillery and intercontinental ballistic missiles. For North Korea, nuclear weapons offer a similar solution: unmatched destructive power at a fraction of the cost of maintaining a massive conventional military.

In 2016, North Korea’s Workers’ Party unveiled the “Byungjin” policy, which aimed to simultaneously advance economic development and nuclear weapons capabilities. This marked a shift from the “Songun” or “military-first” policy and highlighted the dual role of nuclear arms: strengthening national security while reducing the economic burden of a large conventional military. Byungjin’s economic logic is clear—nuclear weapons serve as a force multiplier, allowing Pyongyang to downsize its conventional forces while still deterring external threats, particularly from nuclear-armed adversaries like the United States.

North Korea’s shift toward asymmetric military capabilities, including a focus on nuclear deterrence and submarine-based second-strike capabilities, has allowed the regime to redirect resources toward other sectors of the economy. This shift has not only bolstered the country’s defenses but also facilitated economic stability despite the tightening grip of international sanctions.

Contrary to popular belief, North Korea’s nuclear program is among the most cost-effective components of its military. According to Kim Min Gyu, a former North Korean diplomat who defected in 2009, the program relies on low-cost domestic labor and minimal imported components, making it relatively inexpensive to sustain. This efficiency has enabled North Korea to maintain its nuclear program while achieving modest economic growth, even under unprecedented sanctions.

Reports suggest that while sanctions have curbed North Korea’s potential for economic expansion, they have not led to a significant decline in living standards or consumer goods availability, unlike in other sanctioned states like Iran or Iraq. This resilience can be partly attributed to reduced military expenditures and the strategic value of a smaller, more elite fighting force supported by a nuclear deterrent.

Despite their severity, international sanctions are unlikely to compel Pyongyang to denuclearize. For North Korea, the costs of maintaining its nuclear arsenal are far outweighed by the benefits of reduced conventional military spending and enhanced national security. Furthermore, even if Pyongyang were to denuclearize, sanctions from the United States and its allies are unlikely to be fully lifted, as other pretexts—such as human rights abuses—would likely be used to justify their continuation.

North Korea’s leadership is acutely aware of the fate of non-nuclear states like Iraq and Libya, which faced devastating U.S.-led military interventions. The strategic value of nuclear weapons as a deterrent, combined with their role in relieving economic pressure, makes them indispensable to Pyongyang’s long-term survival.

North Korea’s nuclear arsenal is more than a tool of deterrence—it is a cornerstone of its economic strategy and national security policy. By reducing its dependence on a vast conventional military, Pyongyang has managed to weather sanctions and sustain economic stability. While denuclearization remains a central demand of the international community, the economic and strategic calculus behind North Korea’s nuclear program makes such an outcome unlikely. For Pyongyang, the benefits of retaining its nuclear arsenal far outweigh the potential economic gains of sanctions relief, particularly in a world where U.S. military intervention remains a significant threat.